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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

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August 6, 1974

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TO : NIO - [REDACTED]
FROM : INR/PMT - Bob Baraz *Bob*
SUBJECT: MBFR Verification Study -- Draft of Search Problem

I thought it might be useful to write down some comments on the draft you forwarded on July 16. Basically, my comments boil down to a plea for a somewhat less ambitious paper.

Search Capability vs Net Evaluation

My main problem with the paper is that it drifts into an attempt to lay out a net evaluation of capabilities against hypothetical violations of theoretical provisions of an agreement. I would like to see a somewhat narrower focus on search capability as such in this round. By narrowing the focus to a discussion of search capabilities, I think we can produce a rigorous paper which will stand up to scrutiny by our various readers. If we try to do too much in this round, we shall find ourselves in quarrels all over town as to what agreements were postulated and why.

Examples of the Problems

The first five pages of the draft are open to a number of objections on the ground that they are out of tune with what is actually being negotiated:

-- it is doubtful that an agreement will limit size, type and number of units. The only unit addressed in the Western proposal is a Soviet tank army. (para 32)

-- it is not clear just what equipment would be limited but the paper suggests (para 4) much more extensive limits on equipment than are actually being considered.

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-- reorganization of service units (para 4 e) is not likely to be forbidden; an American option to do just that is likely to be jealously guarded.

The 30 day figure (para 72) would be acceptable as a convenient break for a coverage study. It is not acceptable as a violation detection specification against all scenarios.

It is doubtful that an agreement would make the kind of specific provisions about Hungary and the three Western MDs specified in para 7c.

A Simple Fix

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I think that the problems could be fixed with a single swift blow with a pair of scissors. Cut off the introduction and start the paper at para 8. This will require some assumptions [REDACTED] about what is useful coverage, but would avoid getting wrapped up in the intricacies of agreements formulation and violation management in this first examination of collection resources.

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